Preparing the Force for Data-Centric Warfighting

Preparing the Force for Data-Centric Warfighting

Rapidly and efficiently sharing information across networks, platforms, systems, and security classifications and with mission partners is vital to enabling all-domain awareness and executing nonkinetic and kinetic warfighting operations. Accelerating change toward a digital backbone that allows for seamless information-sharing is limited not just by technology but also by nonmateriel issues, such as culture and policy. These impediments to progress are preventing the Department of the Air Force from realizing Joint All-Domain Command and Control/Advanced Battle Management System and sensing-grid goals. Technical solutions and capabilities are only one piece of a very complex equation.

In this summary report, the authors highlight information-sharing challenges and explore near-term and nonmateriel courses of action (COAs) that the U.S. Air Force could take to better prepare the force for information-sharing at speed and at scale in the European theater. Given that the rules governing information-sharing will change quickly before and during a transition to war, the authors examined how U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) can rapidly adapt to such changes.

Key Findings

  • The rules governing information-sharing—what the authors term the information-sharing terrain—will change rapidly before and during a transition to war.
  • If the United States and its allies do not prepare the force to anticipate those changes, it is unlikely that change will be implemented rapidly enough to effectively implement integrated air and missile defense of the European theater, where delays of even ten seconds can mean the difference between life and death.
  • USAFE is not organized to apply an understanding of the information-sharing terrain to best advantage in planning and operations.
  • Training for proficiency in navigating the current information-sharing terrain is not sufficient to ensure success in future war fights, when terrain likely will have shifted.
  • USAFE has failed to leverage combined exercises to improve its understanding of ways to shape the information-sharing terrain to best advantage in future war fights.

Recommendations

  • USAFE should improve the visibility and navigability of the information-sharing terrain. In the near term, this entails mapping the terrain (i.e., know your audiences or customers), building roads (i.e., tools) so the terrain is easier to traverse, and adding signposts and guardrails (i.e., producing analytic products) so it is easier to navigate. In the longer term, this entails becoming a vocal and persuasive advocate for change in three areas: (1) a priori definition of conditions for emergency disclosure of specific information, (2) creation of new security community designators (e.g., all nations with F-35s), and (3) mandatory review of security classification guides.
  • USAFE should organize for adaptability in information-sharing by, for example, promoting an understanding of the information-sharing terrain among key personnel, including organizational connections within USAFE and with allies and partners.
  • USAFE should train for proficiency and adaptability in information-sharing by, for example, becoming a vocal advocate for U.S. Department of Defense investments to develop a shared repository and methods for imposing synthetic imagery over real-world operations for use in exercises
  • USAFE should engage with allies to shape the future information-sharing terrain. Beginning with structured discussions, wargames, and simulations, USAFE should design a series of initiatives to better elicit allied views on the current information-sharing terrain and how to shape future terrain to the best advantage in future wars in the European theater.

– Published courtesy of RAND

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